UPDATED: Amtrak Silver Star wreck claims two, injures 116

(Source: Railway Age 02/05/2018)

Written by  William C. Vantuono, Editor-in-Chief

The engineer and conductor of Miami-bound Amtrak train 91, the Silver Star, were killed and 116 people on board were injured early Sunday morning, Feb. 4, when the train entered a siding at Cayce, S.C., on CSX’s Columbia Subdivision and struck a stationary CSX autorack train. The National Transportation Safety Board said the turnout into the siding was improperly aligned, i.e. not set for the main line.

Killed were engineer Michael Kempf, 54, and conductor Michael Cella, 36. The wreck occurred at 2:35 AM, when most people on board the train were sleeping. There were 139 passengers and seven crew members on 91, which had departed Penn Station New York the previous day. The Amtrak train struck the lead CSX locomotive (there were two units on the head end), destroying the Amtrak unit’s (a P42 Genesis) cab and causing 91’s café car to fold in half. Most of the injuries occurred in the lead Amfleet coaches; the Viewliner sleepers, which mostly did not derail, were behind the café car.

The signal system where the wreck occurred had been taken out of service for work to install federally mandated Positive Train Control (PTC); the railroad was operating under manual block authority. Yet to be determined is why the turnout was improperly lined. NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt said Feb. 4 that determination is “key to the investigation is learning why that switch was lined that way.” He added that the crash could have been avoided if PTC had been in place.

“It might have been an experienced crew failing to properly reline the turnout,” one experienced operating officer told Railway Age. “It might have been an experienced dispatcher forgetting that he had relieved a crew of protecting the turnout as he would protect it and then forgetting and giving 91 a ‘clear block’ with the switch open. It might have been vandalism. It might have been C&S crew previously working the ‘other side’ of the turnout, lining it against movement into the work zone, and then forgetting to restore the turnout to the main line position when reporting clear. With the system disabled, there’s no way the dispatcher can know the position of the turnout, or accept an occupancy indication. This was effectively dark territory; the signal system was out of service for work. This requires a bulletin order, and/or a track warrant, removing the signal system from service between two fixed points, with the substitution of manual block rules or their equivalent, including the restriction of passenger train movements not to exceed 59 mph, originally due to lack of broken rail protection.”

A source familiar with the territory tells Railway Age:

“The accident happened on the old Seaboard Air Line passenger main line just south of Columbia, S.C. The line is equipped with CTC. It does not yet have PTC. The turnout that was lined for the siding was a hand-throw turnout.

“Examining the photos, there are three tracks. The west track is the siding, the middle track is the main. The east track is an industrial siding. Just south and east of the US 176 bridge is CSX’s Dixianna auto unloading facility. That explains the autoracks.

“Crews working Dixianna work off the main and may stage cars (loads in or empties out) on the hand-operated siding. In this case the local appears to have cleared for 91 in the siding. With two road units and a slug of cars, 91 essentially hit a brick wall. The local crew would have reported being in the clear of the main to the dispatcher so the dispatcher could clear 91. It is presumed the local crew did not line the hand-operated switch back to the main.

“In CTC territory there are usually no switch banners (targets) on hand-operated, electric lock switches. As such, 91’s crew would have had no indication the switch was open until they could actually see the switch points. At 59 mph in the dark, the points may not have even been visible. Once the locomotive hit the switch points, the engineer had about 500 feet—maybe six seconds—before impact.

“So why the accident? There was a ‘signal suspension’ at the time of the accident. If the signals were in service and the hand-operated switch was not lined and locked for the main, the signal before the switch would be red. That signal could be miles away. (I am not sure the exact location of the signals on this segment.). The signal before the red would be ‘approach’ and the engineer would be required to operate by the red signal at ‘restricted speed’ that provides that he stop short of any switch not properly lined, etc., not to exceed 20 mph.

“Since signals were suspended, there was no automated warning that the hand-operated switch was not lined for the main track.

“A signal suspension takes the automatic signals out of service, and the operation uses different rules. Some signals may still display aspects, but with the signal rules suspended, trains are not governed by signal indication and ignore the signals. Signal suspensions are used when there is substantial damage to the system (storms, etc.), the signal system is deemed not to be working property, or, in this case, new signals were being installed. Since there can be only one signal system in place at a time, the old system is taken out of service so the new system can be cut-in and tested. That process can take several days depending on the limits of the cut-in. Suspensions are often done on days with lower traffic volumes, like the weekend, so as to have minimal impact on operations and so that testing of the new signals can be done more quickly.

“In this case, the old system was suspended so the signals that support PTC could be placed in service. The old signals were old technology and were not compatible with PTC, so new signals (circuits, wayside signals, interlockings, etc.) were being cut-in and tested. This issue of old equipment is common on CSX, and replacement is part of the huge cost of PTC for CSX.

“Ironically, the signals were out of service to accommodate installation of a new, modern system and PTC.”

The wreck was not an example of a second crew member creating a safety distraction in the cab, as under manual block operating rules, two people are required to be in the cab. It was, however, the fourth incident with fatalities involving an Amtrak train within the past two months.

An Amtrak train carrying Congressional members to a Republican retreat in West Virginia struck a garbage truck on a crossing near Charlottesville, Va., on Jan. 31, killing one person in the truck. NTSB investigators looking into the crash are focusing on the actions of the driver of the truck. Eyewitnesses have told NTSB investigators the truck driver was seen trying to snake his way through lowered gates on the crossing, which was also equipped with fully functional warning lights and bells, despite signals that included lights warning of the oncoming train, two sources with knowledge of the investigation told CNN.

On Jan. 14, Eugene Lyons, a pastor, and his wife, Dorothy, were killed in Nash County, N.C., when an Amtrak train hit their SUV. It appears the SUV had been driven around lowered crossing gates. A witness confirmed Dorothy Lyons was driving. Lyons’ church stood about 200 yards from the crossing.

On Dec. 18, 2018, three people were killed and more than 70 were injured as an Amtrak Cascades train 501 derailed while traversing a curve leading into an overpass at Interstate 5 southwest of Tacoma, Wash., sending a locomotive and passenger cars crashing onto the highway below. The NTSB, in preliminary findings based upon event recorder data, identified the cause of the wreck as an overspeed condition. NTSB also cited a lapse in situational awareness on the part of the engineer as a possible contributing factor, as there was a second person in the cab. The engineer of 501 has told the NTSB that he does not recall seeing an approach sign with a speed restriction placed two miles before the 30-mph curve upon which the derailment occurred.